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The Unnecessary and Restrictive Constitutional
Amendments Concerning Religious Freedom in
Mexico
Javier Saldaña Serrano*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most widely publicized constitutional reforms in
recent times has been that concerning Articles 24 and 40 of the
Mexican Constitution. In Article 24, a number of changes were made
that purport to broaden the scope of protection to religious freedom
in Mexico. 1 In Article 40, the term “secular” was incorporated as one
of the essential characteristics of the Republic. 2
It should be noted that Article 24 of the Constitution has not
been altered since 1992, the year it underwent important
amendments, 3 and Article 40 has not changed since 1917; in fact, it
came without any modification from the 1857 Constitution. 4

* Researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas (Institute of Legal Research) at
the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) (National Autonomous University of
Mexico).
1. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
2. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 40,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), available at
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_205_30nov12.pdf.
3. In 1992, Article 24 underwent various reforms. First, the reference to practicing acts
of worship “in temples or in private domiciles” was deleted from the first paragraph. The
current second paragraph was also introduced, which did not exist before and prohibits
Congress from establishing or prohibiting any religion. Finally, the former second paragraph
became the third and was left as we understand it today. To see these changes, compare
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) with Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
[C.P.], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 28 de Enero de 1992 (Mex.).
4. Article 40 of the Constitution of 1857 said: “It is the will of the Mexican people to be
constituted in a representative, democratic, federal republic, comprised of free States, sovereign
in all things that concern their internal affairs, but united in a federation established according
to the principles of this fundamental law.” FELIPE TENA RAMÍREZ, LEYES FUNDAMENTALES DE
MÉXICO, 1808–1999 at 613 (20th ed. 1997).
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The text of Article 24, before the amendment, stated the
following:
Every man is free to practice the religious belief that most
pleases him and to practice the ceremonies, devotions, or acts of his
respective faith, provided they do not constitute a crime or offense
punishable by law.
Congress may not make laws that establish or prohibit any
religion.
Religious acts of a sect are ordinarily conducted in houses of
worship. Those that are extraordinarily conducted outside of these
will be subject to the regulation of law. 5

In turn, Article 40 stated: “It is the will of the Mexican people to
be constituted in a representative, democratic, federal republic,
comprised of free States, sovereign in all things that concern their
internal affairs, but united in a federation established according to
the principles of this fundamental law.” 6
After the constitutional amendments of March 2012, the texts of
these articles are as follows. Article 24 now reads:
Every person has the right to freedom of ethical convictions, of
conscience, and of religion, and to have or adopt, as is appropriate,
those of his choice. This freedom includes the right to participate,
individually or collectively, publicly or privately, in the
corresponding ceremonies, devotions, or acts of worship, provided
they do not constitute a crime or offense punishable by law. No one
may use public acts in exercise of this freedom for political
purposes, for proselytizing, or for political propaganda. 7

The last two paragraphs of Article 24 were not modified.

5. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 24, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). Article 24 was amended in 1992, as
articulated in Decreto por el que se Reforman los Artículos 3, 5, 24, 27, 130 y se Adiciona el
Artículo Decimoséptimo Transitorio de las Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos [Decree to Reform Articles 3, 5, 24, 27, 130 and to Add Article 17 Provisional of the
Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 28
de Enero de 1992 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/
ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_121_28ene92_ima.pdf.
6. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 40, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); RAMÍREZ, supra note 4.
7. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
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In turn, Article 40 reads: “It is the will of the Mexican people to
be constituted in a representative, democratic, secular, federal
republic, comprised of free States, sovereign in all things that
concern their internal affairs, but united in a federation established
according to the principles of this fundamental law.” 8
The sections set forth below will attempt to answer the following
questions. Is it true that the amendments to Article 24 extend
protections of human rights, specifically protection of religious
freedom, as was adamantly indicated at the time? 9 Was it necessary
to incorporate the Republic’s secularism into the Mexican
Constitution? Ultimately, what benefits will both constitutional
amendments bring to Mexican citizens?
Answers to these questions will be given through ten very
specific arguments. From this point onward, this Article’s attention
will be fixed primarily on the content of Article 24. Although the
Author makes some comments about Article 40, he leaves a more
detailed analysis of it for another article.
II. DISCUSSION

A.
The first pertinent observation is that, when examined closely,
all of the content in Article 24 before the reform had an essential
purpose to establish the right of religious freedom; in other words,
any citizen or legal scholar knew perfectly well that this provision
protected the fundamental right of religious freedom. Now, after the

8. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 40,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
9. The alleged extension of rights was one of the main arguments that was brandished
to pass the amendment. As just one example, then-Senator Melquiades Morales Flores upon
taking the floor during the discussion said:
It is certain that our Magna Carta [Constitution] recognizes and protects religious
freedom, but it does not contemplate the freedom of ethical convictions or of
conscience. This is why it is necessary to elevate these rights to constitutional status,
for as we expand the universe of human rights in our legislation, we will be
answering and fulfilling the struggles and aspirations of Mexicans to obtain these
rights.

Versión estenográfica de la sesión ordinaria del Senado, del miércoles 28 de marzo de 2012, Primera parte
[Transcript of the Regular Meeting of the Senate, on Wednesday, March 28, 2012, Part One]
(Mex.), available at http://200.33.232.136/index.php/periodo-ordinario/versiones/3370-versionestenografica-de-la-sesion-ordinaria-del-senado-del-miercoles-28-de-marzo-de2012.html?start=1.
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constitutional reform, Article 24 contains not only this right, but it
has also permanently included (under very questionable legal
drafting) two more rights and freedoms: (1) freedom of “ethical
convictions,” and (2) freedom of “conscience.” With these changes,
there is no longer one right or freedom included in this single
normative provision, but three.
Although at first glance this may not raise any problems, and
may be considered something superficial, it creates at least two
immediate problems, one considerably minor and one of greater
magnitude. The first is that in defining the rights in question, it
would have been convenient not to include three freedoms in one
paragraph, but to recognize each of these in at least three different
paragraphs. This might have helped to avoid the problems and errors
that will be presented throughout this Article.
The greater problem essentially concerns the exercise, and
eventual protection, of the rights in question. Formerly, if Article 24
was invoked for protection, it was known that this concerned the
right to religious freedom. Now, if the same provision is pled, is it a
request to protect the right to religious freedom or all three rights? 10
At first glance, it could be said that this question can be resolved by
focusing on the specific facts of each case, but the solution is not so
simple. For example, how does one solve the problem of a
manifestation of a civil society that proclaims and defends atheism or
secularism? Will this practice be protected by freedom of conscience,
freedom of ethical convictions, or freedom of religion?
When the text of Article 24 stated that every man was free to
practice the religious belief that most pleased him and to practice the
ceremonies, devotions, or acts of his respective faith, it was clear
that this referred to religious freedom. However, in the previous
example, how would we differentiate this freedom from the other
two? Perhaps such demonstrations in favor of atheism or secularism

10. This is the problem that Mendoza Enrique Delgado seems to point out, noting:
The project—which refers to the draft that amends Article 24 and which is now being
discussed as part of the States of the Republic (JSS)—is confusing, because the good
that Article 24 protects is the freedom to adjust one’s own behavior to one’s beliefs,
or practice certain acts outwardly; this is what is meant by professing . . . . This is
now foggy and will require further clarification in the context of human rights
recognized by the Constitution itself.
Enrique Mendoza Delgado, Diálogo entre legisladores y sociedad civil, in REFORMAS AL 24
CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 26 (2012).
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would be expressions of “ceremonies, devotions, or acts of . . .
faith” as stated in Article 24. 11
Similarly, believing that such a manifestation could be covered
by either of the other two freedoms—that is, by ethical convictions
or conscience—would entail an even greater problem to religious
freedom because no distinctive feature clearly establishes the
difference between protecting religious freedom and protecting
secularism under freedom of ethical belief or of conscience. This, as
is clearly shown, is confusing.
Thus, we can conclude from this first argument that the
constitutional reform not only creates confusion by establishing
three different freedoms within one normative provision, but, even
worse, it blurs the purpose of protecting the right that it purportedly
safeguarded. This blurring creates greater difficulty concerning the
secondary regulation of this normative provision. What would a
future regulatory law concerning Article 24 be called? The Statutory
Law of the Freedom of Ethical Convictions, Conscience, and
Religion?

B.
In connection with the above problem, part of the amended
Article 24 expressly provides, “[t]his freedom includes . . . .” 12 In so
doing, it literally refers to just one freedom, when it earlier
announced that there were three: freedom of (1) ethical convictions,
(2) conscience, and (3) religion. The obvious question, then, is
whether these constitute just one freedom or three different
freedoms. If these are just one freedom—as the constitutional
amendment expressly reads today—what was the purpose of
previously announcing this freedom in three different ways? Or if
they are three different freedoms, why refer to them by the phrase,
“[t]his freedom includes . . . .”? It is evident that the Mexican
legislature did not have a clear idea of what it was protecting
because, as the text reads, it is unclear whether it wanted to expand
the list of rights and freedoms or just put more emphasis on one of
these. This not only reveals inadequate and poor legislative
drafting—grievous when on a constitutional level—but it also shows
11. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
12. Id.
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a lack of even minimal attention to what is being done when drafting
a provision of such importance.
We must remember that one of the main tasks of jurisprudence
and of legislative drafting is to distinguish with clarity and accuracy
the different rights dealt with, indicating their typical or specific
characters, their limits, their nature, etc. This is necessary to avoid
confusing some rights with others, to not superimpose some rights
on others, and to not identify some rights as breeds of others—a
confusion that is happening now under the constitutional reform.
This requirement is even more important when such rights are set
forth in the supreme text of any fairly developed state, like a
constitutional government. Therefore, it is necessary to establish
that, from the actual wording of Article 24, it is not clear what might
be the typical characteristics that could help us clearly differentiate
among the freedoms of ethical convictions, conscience, and religion.
It is true that constitutional doctrine, concerning topics like the
specialties of human rights and religion law, does not have a
universally accepted definition for each of these three freedoms, but
a part of constitutional doctrine has been responsible for establishing
the typical characteristics of these freedoms, indicating the specific
contours of these freedoms and how to understand their
uniqueness. 13 This is not the place to detail such characterization,
but beginning such an exercise is well worth doing, even if it is only
a general characterization.
Under this doctrine, if we consider that ethical convictions are an
expression of freedom of thought (as a portion of Mexican legal
doctrine has recognized), 14 this freedom encompasses beliefs (not
religious), ideas, or opinions of any kind, and, therefore, its typical

13. See JAVIER HERVADA, LOS ECLESIASTICISTAS ANTE UN ESPECTADOR 183–224 (1993)
[hereinafter HERVADA, LOS ECLESIASTICISTAS]. Before this work, Professor Hervada had also
published another article in which he discussed the same topic. See Javier Hervada, Libertad de
conciencia y error sobre la moralidad de una terapéutica, in PERSONA Y DERECHO 11, 13–53 (1984)
[hereinafter
Hervada,
Libertad
de
conciencia],
available
at
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0C
DUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdspace.unav.es%2Fdspace%2Fbitstream%2F10171%2F12442
%2F1%2FPD_11_01.pdf&ei=Pm81Ufb5IIedqQH5r4CQCA&usg=AFQjCNHOxorUEL9KxFqhdgcRNVTJZmUdw&sig2=q7tr52aiCuzOcXCylqmSjw&bvm=bv.43148975,d.a
WM. This earlier work is what we follow in this Article.
14. Jorge Adame Goddard, El proyecto de reformas del artículo 24 constitucional sobre libertad
religiosa, in REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 15 (2012), available at
http://es.catholic.net/sexualidadybioetica/371/942/articulo.php?id=53509.
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characteristic would be intellectual activity in search of truth or the
adoption of views relating to philosophy, culture, science, politics,
art, recreation, etc. 15
On the other hand, the subject of freedom of conscience is
distinct from freedom of ethical convictions, and many theorists who
refer to freedom of conscience have maintained this distinction. 16
The freedom of conscience consists of acting according to the
dictates or judgments of practical reason, according to the morality
of an action that was performed, is being performed, or will be
performed. 17 Therefore, its purpose pertains specifically to those
moral judgments to which man must conform his actions without
being subject to any type of coercion or influence. 18
Finally, freedom of religion can be distinguished from the other
two freedoms because its purpose is different. This freedom’s
purpose is religion, and therefore it embodies the relations that men
establish with God in free manner or, in other words, without any
type of coercion through various external or public demonstrations,
among other things, and where the State is incompetent. 19 The
distinctive feature to consider in this characterization is the idea of
God as “that transcendent—not human—reality that implies a
certain conception and interpretation of all existence and of life
itself, so that this conception, transformed into doctrine, also
determines one’s behavior through the demands of a particular
moral.” 20
15. See Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 35–37.
16. An example of this understanding that freedom of conscience and its purpose are
distinct from the freedom of thought and religion can be seen in Jesús Bogarín Díaz, Contribución
a la construcción de un concepto autónomo de libertad de conciencia, in EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO A LAS
PUERTAS DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JUAN GOTI ORDEÑANA 36–38 (2006),
available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=
rja&ved=0CDUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdialnet.unirioja.es%2Fservlet%2Farticulo%3Fco
digo%3D2302947&ei=8nA1UY_rPMeoqgG_qICQBg&usg=AFQjCNGpqxCJMofQY3c36-UhRe9JakSlQ&sig2=0hyt0hKLdPYNtfgHwAs1xw&bvm=bv.43148975,d.aWM.
17. See Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 41–46.
18. Although ideas with different nuances exist, this is the majority opinion in specialized
doctrine concerning the freedom of conscience and is sustained by Jesús Bogarín Díaz. Díaz,
supra note 16, at 37–49.
19. See HERVADA, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 38–41.
20. Joaquín Mantecón, La libertad religiosa como derecho humano, in TRATADO DE DERECHO
ECLESIÁSTICO 88 (1994). A very detailed analysis of the different ways of defining “religion” can
be found in BRETT G. SCHARFFS & W. COLE DURHAM, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL,
INTERNATIONAL
AND
COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES
39–48
(2010),
available
at
http://www.aspenlawschool.com/books/durhamscharffs/default.asp.
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This distinction, or some kind of effort to classify freedom of
religion, may have helped to distinguish the original freedom from
the new freedoms that were introduced in that constitutional
reform, 21 but this did not happen. Instead, the three referenced
freedoms are mentioned after this introduction: “This freedom
includes . . . .” Is this not patently incongruent?
In light of this second argument, it can be concluded that the
constitutional amendment at issue is confusing, because its own
writing does not say whether Article 24 protects three different
freedoms—as the article initially states—or just one freedom—as it
expressly notes later. In accordance with correct legislative drafting
and the most basic legal knowledge, these should have been
established in different paragraphs, to indicate that they were three
different freedoms. Also, they should not have been confusingly
referred to later as just one freedom.

C.
In line with what we have discussed, a third observation raises
an issue of equal importance. It has to do with the question of
whether the freedoms of ethical convictions, conscience, and
religion—now included in the Constitution—really are human
rights, or whether they are mere inventions drawn from antireligious legislative ideology (specifically anti-Catholic), legislators’
ignorance, or partisan political convenience of those who voted on
the amendment. Thus, it is necessary to investigate whether there is
a legal reference that fairly confirms that these are human rights and
not an improvisation.
This question could be seen as absurd in this day and age, but it
is not, especially because we live in a time characterized by an
increasingly frequent and casual tendency to call everything “human
rights.” Today more than ever, it is appropriate to pause and refer to
positive law and from there to ask what rights exist, and whether the

21. This effort to distinguish has also been made in Mexican doctrine where a
differentiation between the freedoms of thought, conscience, and religion is generally accepted.
See Eugenia del Carmen Diez Hidalgo, Desafíos actuales de la libertad religiosa en México a la luz de
los derechos humanos, in UNA PUERTA ABIERTA A LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA: (MÉXICO A QUINCE AÑOS
DE LAS REFORMAS CONSTITUCIONALES EN MATERIA RELIGIOSA 1992-2007) at 35–136 (2007).
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rights to these announced freedoms have been recognized as such in
any document.
One answer would be that in the case of the rights to freedom of
conscience and religion, we can quickly confirm that these truly are
human rights. We can look to any constitution or international
treaty that protects these rights to confirm this. However, can we say
the same about the freedom of ethical convictions? The answer to
this would not be nearly as clear.
Skepticism about whether this freedom, now introduced into the
Mexican Constitution, is or is not a human right is based on two
arguments. The first is that Mexican constitutional history does not
contain a single reference, express or implied, to this right. In other
words, none of the constitution’s texts has recognized in its list of
rights the right of ethical convictions. To clarify, this law has simply
never existed in Mexican constitutional history.
This problem can also be confirmed if we move it into the
international arena. Here, there is no record that the freedom of
ethical convictions has been recognized as a fundamental right in any
of the international documents protecting human rights.
If ethical convictions are not found as a right in Mexican
constitutional history, and if it has not had place in the long list of
international documents protecting human rights, what is the origin
of this right? What does this new right mean? Now, if its meaning is
unknown, what did the legislature want to protect by including it in
the Constitution? It must be clearly recognized that this “new” right
to freedom of ethical convictions was invented by the Mexican
legislature. No one knows for sure from where the legislature
extracted this right. 22
Thus, freedom of ethical convictions is foreign to the national
and international culture of human rights. What does an expression
so confusing and ambiguous as ethical convictions mean? What is
the legal status of this freedom? Has a national or international court
spoken concerning this right? Is there any hermeneutic reference
that helps us know how to interpret it? If the answer to these

22. Laporta has discussed the problem of including “new” rights, noting that it is quite
reasonable to assume “that the more the list of human rights is multiplied, the less force these
rights demand, and the more legal or moral power these rights are presumed to have, the more
limited ought to be the list of rights that adequately justify this list.” Francisco Laporta, Sobre el
in
DOXA
4
at
23
(1987),
available
at
concepto
de
derechos
humanos,
http://www.bioetica.org/cuadernos/bibliografia/laporta.pdf.
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questions is no, reasons for including this right in the constitutional
text should have been given, but none are provided. At most, what
has been argued is that this freedom “guaranteed the rights of
nonbelievers—agnostic and atheists.” But if this were the case, then
the situation would become even worse given the ignorance of the
Mexican legislature. We all know that if something is characterized
by religious freedom—and in general any public freedom—it is
precisely because it is primarily a freedom from coercion or, in other
words, a freedom from imposing a particular religion or religious
belief. The Mexican legislature should study and better understand
religious freedom before proposing far-reaching constitutional
amendments such as Article 24.
Expanding on the previous point, it should be remembered that
while religious freedom protects the relationship that man
establishes with God, this includes more than just protecting
affirmative acts of adhering to this divinity. It means that every man
should be prevented from exercising any kind of pressure on how
others worship God or choose not to. 23 With this understanding, if
the Mexican legislature intended to protect atheists and agnostics so
that religious beliefs were not imposed on them, this safeguard was
already included in religious freedom. Therefore, it was unnecessary
to invent a new right like ethical convictions to protect those with no
religion.
The second argument against the new right of ethical convictions
deals with the question of which ethical convictions are protected by
the constitutional amendment. Does this include all ethical
convictions that are observed in a pluralistic society? If not, which
ones will and will not actually be protected? And if some are
defended and some are not, what criteria will determine which are
and which are not? The author fears that the final answer to these
questions will necessarily lead us to confirm that the political powers
will give the final say. In other words, the current government will
determine what ethical convictions will and will not be covered. But
accepting this leaves a wide margin of discretion to political
authorities, needlessly risking observance and respect for human
rights. History has shown that leaving the door open to the
discretion of any political authority places before us a totalitarian

23. See Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 40.
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and dictatorial regime, which has occurred more than once in
Mexico.
The conclusion of this third argument seems clear. Ethical
convictions, which are claimed to be a new human right, have never
been recognized as such, not in the long history of the Mexican
Constitution nor in any of the existing documents that protect
human rights. This justifiably leads to theoretical skepticism, not
only because of this phrase’s enigmatic meaning but also and
especially because of its uncertain legal status.

D.
In the same line of argument as above, there is another comment
that should be made concerning the term ethical convictions, which
may be more serious and sensitive than those made thus far.
The fact that the Mexican legislature has established in only one
article both the freedom of ethical convictions and the freedom of
religion, legally integrates both freedoms and, as a result, their
respective purposes. In other words, by this inclusion, the Mexican
legislature (consciously or not) placed any ethical belief (the
purposes of this freedom) on equal footing with religion (the
purpose of the right to religious freedom). Frankly, this brings
dangerous consequences.
First, it should be noted that when we speak of ethical
convictions, this is not just one conviction—or a few ethical
currents—but a huge variety of convictions, all of which have
different manifestations and foundations. Certainly it can be said
that throughout the history of moral philosophy there have been as
many moral conceptions as thinkers that have addressed these
ethical convictions. 24 Of the vast universe of ethical convictions,
which are covered under this constitutional amendment?
As just one example, let’s consider hedonism, which is a moral
theory that consists mainly of the pursuit of happiness through the

24. One of the most important works in Spanish that has been written explaining in
detail the different ethical conceptions throughout history is that of Professor Victoria Camps. 1,
2,
3
VICTORIA
CAMPS,
HISTORIA
DE
LA
ÉTICA
(1999),
available
at
http://www.planetadelibros.com/historia-de-la-etica-voliii-libro-17069.html. Another excellent
work is the more recent work edited by Carlos Gómez and Javier Muguerza. LA AVENTURA DE LA
MORALIDAD: PARADIGMAS, FRONTERAS Y PROBLEMAS DE LA ÉTICA (Javier Muguerza & Carlos Gómez
eds., 2007), available at http://www.casadellibro.com/libro-la-aventura-de-la-moralidadparadigmas-fronteras-y-problemas-de-la-etica/9788420648729/1159686.
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satisfaction of bodily pleasures, among other means. 25 Is bodily joy
and pleasure on the same level as a spiritual relationship with God?
Ultimately, what underlies this proposal is identifying any ethical
belief—or way of seeing the world—with religion or one’s
relationship with God. This not only supports giving ethical
convictions equal value, but more significantly it brings about an
unavoidable consequence: moral and obviously religious relativism.
What appears again is the uncompromising and anti-religious spirit
of the times. The theoretical and practical consequences of this
ideological secularism are particularly serious, and we should be
aware of these, not only to avoid confusion, but above all to better
protect and safeguard rights. Here are some cases of both
consequences.
With regard to the theoretical consequences, it must be said that
the foretold equalization raises in the background a renunciation of
truth—in this case religious truth. But history has taught us that
religion (the subject of religious freedom) always respects truth, not
the ideology of any ethical conviction. It is very difficult to think that
religions such as Islam, Judaism, or Christianity present themselves
as mere ethical convictions, since they consider themselves to be
repositories of truth.
In this sense, religious freedom does not mean indifference, as
opposed to what is necessary and which is not free. This definition
appears to present circular reasoning, when considering that the
human intellect is unable to grasp reality as a whole and, therefore,
truth on a religious plane. Based on these theoretical reasons, it is
not possible to equalize an alleged freedom of ethical convictions
with the right to religious freedom.
The practical consequences are equally significant because they
concern nothing less than the protection of the rights of the
freedom. Placing the freedom of ethical convictions on equal footing
with religious freedom would lead to legal absurdities, like equating
the refusal to serve in the military on pacifist motives (an ethical
conviction) with religious reasons of not killing. Are these exactly
the same? In the same sense, does a person who refuses to eat meat
due to ethical convictions (naturalism) merit the same consideration

25. “The beginning and the end of human life, that is, happiness consists of bodily
pleasure.” F. BLÁZQUEZ CARMONA, AGUSTÍN DEVESA DEL PRADO & MARIANO CANO GALINDO,
DICCIONARIO DE TÉRMINOS ÉTICOS 257 (1999).
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as a person such as a Jew or Muslim who does not eat certain species
for strictly religious motives? Is it the same to not eat meat for the
consideration and love of other animals as for obedience to God?
This Article contends that this is not the same, which is the problem
that comes from equalizing the two.
As has been shown, equalization between ethical convictions and
religious freedom, or rather between the purposes of the two
freedoms, brings very significant problems to human rights, but this
did not matter in the least to the Mexican legislature, which
introduced a new freedom that did not seem sufficiently
contemplated.
The concluding reasoning in this fourth argument is obvious:
placing the freedom of ethical convictions and religious freedom on
an equal plane clearly poses two kinds of problems, some theoretical
and others of a practical nature. Concerning the former problems,
the idea of renouncing religious truth and promoting moral and
religious relativism is presented, in the best case, as a request that
would at least initially merit a tremendous rational discussion before
being accepted without restriction. The practical problems are also
evident, because until now it has been clear that protecting rights for
religious reasons is very different from protecting rights based on a
particular worldview.

E.
Another consequence derived from this lack of clarity that the
term ethical convictions generates is that some authors have
considered its inclusion in the Mexican Constitution unnecessary
because freedom of ethical convictions relates to freedom of thought,
which was already protected by Article 6.26 For example, authors
like Jorge Adame argue that “[t]he freedom to manifest these ideas
necessarily implies the inner freedom to conceive and assent to these
ideas, so that the freedom to have ethical convictions and manifest
them publicly was already recognized by the Constitution, and there
was no need to include it in Article 24.” 27
This point coincides with part of the specialized Spanish doctrine
regarding ecclesiastical law, which points out that these convictions
26. Goddard, supra note 14, at 15; Gerardo Cruz González, La libertad religiosa en la
Constitución de México a debate, in REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 36 (2012).
27. Goddard, supra note 14, at 15.
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are a “system of ideas and judgments that a person forms about
things and that lets him or her act as a rational being in compliance with his
or her natural purposes, whether of a personal nature or of a social
nature.” 28
Indeed, those that believe this definition are correct. The very
meaning of the term “conviction” tells us that this is an idea to
which a person strongly adheres. 29 However, we must remember
that in addition to nonreligious convictions or ideas that are set forth
and protected in Article 6 of the Constitution, often people’s deepest
convictions are religious in nature (those for which they are capable
of performing great personal sacrifices and offering even their own
lives). Thus, it seems repetitive and unnecessary to amend Article 24
of the Constitution not only because this right was already found in
Article 6 (as noted by the aforementioned authors), but because
Article 24 itself already contained it by recognizing one’s religious
convictions. Consequently, it was understandably unnecessary to
include this “new” right of ethical convictions in the constitutional
amendment. 30
To avoid this unnecessary repetition, the national legislature
should have followed, as it seems was its intent, the typology of
various international documents that protect human rights and that
contain the three rights of quintessential freedoms, for example,
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 31

28. Hervada, Libertad de consciencia, supra note 13, at 35; see also Mantecón, supra note 20,
at 110; IVÁN C. IBÁN & LUIS PRIETO SANCHÍS, LECCIONES DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 141 (2d ed.
1990) (emphasis added).
29. See REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA, DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA 438 (22nd ed.
2001).
30. In case the above discussion is not sufficient, it should also be noted that apart from
the Mexican Constitution, those rights (thought, conscience, and religion) were already
recognized in more than one international document signed by Mexico that deals with and
protects human rights. Therefore, the amendment was not only unnecessary but also repetitive
for yet another reason. We must not forget that in 2011 Mexico amended its Constitution,
recognizing greater protection of the fundamental rights set out in international documents that
protect human rights. For an analysis of the constitutional amendment to Article I of the
Mexican Constitution and the manner in which international documents concerning human
rights should be interpreted, see Juan Díaz Romero & Juan Nepomuceno Silva Meza, Comentarios
a las reformas constitucionales de 2011 sobre derecho humanos y juicio de amparo, in 10 ENSAYOS Y
CONFERENCIAS DE LOS FORJADORES DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN 39 (2012).
31. Article 18 says: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.” 1 JAVIER HERVADA & JOSÉ M. ZUMAQUERO, TEXTOS
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Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966,32 or Articles 12 and 13 of the Pact of San José, Costa Rica of
1969.33 The second document says: “Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” 34
In conclusion, the constitutional amendment was unnecessary as
being repetitive because what it added was already in Article 6 of the
Constitution and also in Article 24 itself, assuming it dealt with
religious convictions. It is also repetitive because these freedoms
were already in various international documents that protect human
rights.

INTERNACIONALES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS: 1776–1976 at 148 (2d ed. 1992).
32. Article 18 reads:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
33. This pact is also known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 12
reads:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right includes
freedom to maintain or to change one’s religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or
disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in
public or in private.
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain
or to change his religion or beliefs.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the
limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others.
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the religious
and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with their own
convictions.
American Convention on Human Rights art. 12, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. Meanwhile,
all of Article 13 is dedicated to freedom of thought. Id. at art. 13.
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
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F.
In the context of the discussion concerning international
documents that protect human rights, it is worth mentioning that if
we compare the constitutional amendment of Article 24 with any of
the international documents that protect religious freedom, this
reform is clearly restrictive by omission since all of the international
texts provide greater protection of the right to religious freedom and,
by extension, to other freedoms. 35
There are several aspects in which this legal restriction can be
observed; however, let us mention only two of these. Article 18 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly states that the
exercise of religious freedom also includes the ability to change one’s
religion or belief and that no one may be subjected to restrictive
measures that impair the freedom to change or maintain one’s
religion, as is also set forth in the Pact of San José, Costa Rica of
1969.36 However, this very important aspect of religious freedom is
not covered by the constitutional amendment. It is true that
according to progressive interpretation criteria regarding human
rights, when deciding an issue, the document that provides greater
protection should be used. 37 However, in a legal culture as legalistic
as is Mexico’s, which has barely begun to have some idea of what
human rights are and how to protect them through interpreting
them, it would have been more appropriate to also include the
freedom to change one’s religion in the discussed amendment, but
this was not the case. This is another reason why the reform is
limited and restrictive.
Another instance where the restrictive spirit of the amendment
is demonstrated concerns religious education. If the legislature really
35. For a detailed analysis of the reception that international documents that protect
human rights have had on religious freedom, see SCHARFFS & DURHAM, supra note 20, at 77–111
(2010); Javier Martínez-Torrón, La protección internacional de la libertad religiosa, in TRATADO DE
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 141–293 (1994). Information on Javier Martínez-Torrón and his book can
be found at http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Mart%C3%ADnez-Torr%C3%B3n.
36. According to Article 12, Clause 2, “No one shall be subject to restrictions that might
impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or beliefs.” American Convention on
Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
37. Edgar Carpio Marcos, La interpretación de los derechos fundamentales, in 1
EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR, INTERPRETACIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL 327 (2005), available at
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/rev/cconst/cont/14/rb/rb15.htm. RAMÍREZ GARCÍA,
HUGO SAÚL & PALLARES YABUR, PEDRO DE JESÚS: DERECHOS HUMANOS 72–73 (2011), available at
http://libros-revistas-derecho.vlex.es/vid/ramirez-hugo-saul-pallares-yabur-oxford-388246672.
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intended to enlarge the right of religious freedom, perhaps it would
have considered that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
1966, and also the Pact of San José, Costa Rica of 1969 all establish
that parents or legal guardians have the right to ensure that their
children receive religious or moral education that is in accordance
with their own convictions. 38 This point is undoubtedly one of the
most significant human rights, specifically as the right to religious
freedom is concerned. Many countries recognize this right in their
legislation, 39 but it was simply not mentioned in the constitutional
reform that was brought about in Mexico.
Although the original project did indeed contemplate this right
of parents, the final draft and approval simply did not include it,
largely due to Jacobean and nineteenth-century ideology that
continues to weigh heavily on the Mexican political class and is
almost always defended, even over respect for human rights and the
commitments that Mexico as a country has acquired through
approving and signing international documents. From this point of
view, one can seriously argue that in Mexico there is not a real and
genuine concern for defending human rights, because when a
constitutional amendment is introduced that amplifies them, it must
be accompanied with all its consequences. In this case, this means
recognizing the right of parents to have their children receive
religious education that is consistent with their beliefs.
On this point, one might object by saying that the right of
parents or guardians to have their children receive religious and
moral education that is in accordance with their convictions has
existed in Mexico since the amendment to Article 3 of the
Constitution that occurred in 1992, which eliminated the prohibition
of this right. However, we must note that this right actually exists,
but only for parents and guardians who can send their children to
38. By way of only one example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966 states in Article 18, paragraph 4: “The States [/] Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
39. On this point, see Javier Ferrer Ortiz, Los derechos educativos de los padres en una sociedad
plural, in EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO A LAS PUERTAS DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR
JUAN
GOTI
ORDEÑANA
125–46
(2006),
available
at
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2302954.
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private schools, 40 which does not take into account those who send
their children to public schools. Here, there is clearly religious
discrimination that cannot be tolerated in a truly democratic system
of law—one in which there are no first- and second-class citizens—
but the text of the Mexican Constitution currently establishes such
discrimination. 41
Also, the right that parents now have concerning students in
private schools was not a right directly enshrined in the
Constitution, but rather an omission by the legislature concerning
private education: because religious teaching in private or unofficial
schools was not prohibited, it was implicitly authorized. As González
Schmal said, this was treated, “in a certain sense, as a tolerated
freedom and not a proclaimed freedom. It went from prohibition to
tolerance, or, if you will, from extralegal tolerance to legal
tolerance.” 42
In conclusion, the constitutional amendment to Article 24 is
highly restrictive, limiting, and discriminatory. First, when compared
with other legal documents—in this case international—the other
documents recognized a much broader right to religious freedom.
Next, the amendment is limiting since it did not go further and
expressly establish the rights of parents to have their children
receive religious education in accordance with their convictions. And
it is highly discriminatory because the Mexican legislature wanted to
continue to maintain that the parents or guardians who could enjoy
this right were only those whose economic capacity would allow
them to send their children to private schools.

40. Section VI of Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution says: “Individual schools may
provide education in all its types and means. In the terms that the law establishes, the State will
grant and withdraw official recognition of studies conducted in particular facilities. In the case of
primary, secondary, and post-secondary education . . . .” Constitución Política de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 3, sec. VI, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de
Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
41. On this point, see ALBERTO PATIÑO, LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y PRINCIPIO DE COOPERACIÓN
EN HISPANOAMÉRICA 102–03 (2011).
42. RAÚL GONZÁLEZ SCHMAL, DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO: UN MARCO PARA LA
LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA 221 (1997). On the same subject of the right of parents, see Sandra Cecilia
García Aguirre, La libertad de enseñanza, in ANTONIO MOLINA MELIÁ, LAS LIBERTADES RELIGIOSAS:
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO 213–18 (1997).
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G.

Another very important issue that the Mexican doctrine has
often stressed, related to the amendment’s restrictive effect,43 is the
reductionist spirit of the announced amendment. After careful
observation, it can be noted that the exercise of religious freedom is
reduced to only one of its manifestations: expression of worship.
After establishing that everyone has the right to freedom of
religion (a misnomer because it should have been that of religious
freedom), the relevant part of Article 24 states: “This freedom
includes the right to participate, individually or collectively, publicly
or privately, in the corresponding ceremonies, devotions, or acts of
worship . . . .” 44
With this language, the Mexican legislature reduced the right to
religious freedom to only freedom of worship, but it must be
remembered that this expression does not just concern a singular
manner of living and expressing religious beliefs. In fact, there are
other ways by which one can express the right to religious freedom.
Among these we can mention religious professions, religious
education, religious outreach, etc. Why reduce religious freedom to a
single manifestation when there are many more ways to express this
freedom?
Concerning this point, one of the most prominent Mexican
theorists on religious freedom said: “It appears that the problem and
the need of those who promoted the amendment was not to
recognize the right of religious freedom in its many facets, but only
one in particular—religious worship—as if it was not already
contained in the often-cited article 24 of the Constitution.” 45
Thus, the problem is that for the national legislature, religious
freedom is reduced solely to religious worship. This poses
particularly serious problems because it restricts protection of a very
broad right to one of its facets: worship, whether in public or private.
The Mexican legislature missed an opportunity to expand
governmental respect for and recognition of religious freedom and to
make it inclusive of important issues such as religious proselytism,

43. González, supra note 26, at 36–37.
44. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
45. Raúl González Schmal, Comentarios sobre la reforma al artículo 24 constitucional, in
REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 9 (2012).
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religious marriage, spiritual aid, health, etc., through which the right
to religious freedom is manifested.
The conclusion to this seventh argument seems clear. The right
to religious freedom and the way in which this freedom is
manifested is broader and therefore much richer than the mere
expression of it through worship. Using this expression-based
description exhibited the legislature’s missed opportunity to extend
the scope of protection of this right. Consequently, it can be said
that this is a reductionist amendment.

H.
There is another aspect that national doctrine has often stressed
and that was unfortunately not sufficiently contemplated in the
amendment of Article 24. This has to do with the broad discretion
that public authorities have, which could restrict the right of
religious freedom.
In relevant part, the amendment states that the freedom of
ethical convictions, conscience, and religion includes the right to
participate, either individually or collectively, in public or private, in
ceremonies, devotions, and acts of worship, “provided they do not
constitute a crime or offense punishable by law.” 46 And it then
establishes that “[n]o one may use public acts of exercise of this
freedom for political purposes, for proselytizing, or for political
propaganda.” 47
It may be useful to point out an important distinction about
when we face a crime and when we face an offense and, most
importantly, what is the attitude of the authority concerning both
acts. Obviously, if an action is characterized as a crime in the
respective penal code, authorities only have authority to punish the
offender or offenders, whether or not (1) they were motivated by
their religious beliefs and/or (2) they were expressing a religious
conviction. Such application of the law leaves little uncertainty, but
will the result be so clear when the text of the Article refers to not
only crimes but also to offenses? It appears that it will not because,
among other reasons, this term is not very clear in national
legislation, thus opening the possibility for authorities—mainly
46. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
47. Id.
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administrative authorities—to establish any kind of punishment for
what it deems to be an offense.
Concerning this, Jorge Adame wrote:
There is no doubt that the act of worship cannot be a crime under
the law (assuming the legislature classifies as crimes those that
actually are crimes, since it has in the past classified certain acts as
crimes, simply due to hatred of religion, acts of worship that in no
way offend common good), but it is too much to say that persons
cannot perform acts of worship involv[ing] an administrative
“offense,” which opens the doors for the government to restrict the
observance of acts of worship. So, the defect that the current article
already had is not overcome; rather, the project reiterates it. 48

More serious consequences come from the latter part of the
constitutional reform; it left to the respective authorities’ free will to,
for example, assess any demonstration that may have the appearance
of being expressed with political purposes by any religious
representative. It was obvious that the target of this part of the
constitutional reform is the Catholic Church and some of its
representatives, who clearly have opposed legislation that threatens
not only their religious ideology, but also the most basic human
rights. Is this the way that the rights of religious freedom in a
pluralistic society are properly protected? We must state things
clearly and free ourselves of hypocrisy. In a state of law, religious
faiths have complete authority to express their views on social
issues, including, of course, political issues such as pro-choice or
pro-euthanasia laws, especially since implementing those laws
threatens human rights.
But limitations on and violations of the right to religious
freedom do not end here, but extend and intensify due to this
reform. Given that the freedom at issue includes the freedom of
ethical convictions, conscience, and religion, all these freedoms and
their eventual manifestations should be careful to avoid political
issues and campaigning for or against any propaganda. This would
further open the doors to the already broad and arbitrary power that
authorities have to punish any religious organization or any of its
representatives.
Do not think that these concerns are unfounded or that they
view reality inaccurately. There have been cases where authorities
48. Goddard, supra note 14, at 17–18.
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have voided political elections simply because the candidate of a
party, in his capacity as a parishioner (as could any citizen), attended
Mass to start his campaign. Is this an “offense” severe enough to
have voided the respective elections? According to the respective
authorities, it proved to be a more than sufficient reason to nullify
the respective election and take the victory from the winning
candidate. 49
Other examples also demonstrate the danger of the broad and
arbitrary discretion of the respective authorities. Serious prejudices
were suffered by priests in any State of the Republic who read in
their respective masses a pastoral document sent by their bishop that
asked the congregation to carefully consider which candidate to vote
for in the elections that Sunday. The document reminded them that
as Catholics, they should be in favor of the right to life, but it did not
specifically mention the political party that had used this as its
campaign slogan. 50
In the same sense, we must not forget the strong financial
penalty imposed on a candidate for governor of a state for campaign
meetings that were held with evangelical groups, or for the act of
simply invoking God, saying, “I will win with the support of the will
of the people and of God.” 51 Is this the religious freedom that the
exclaimed constitutional amendment seeks to expand and protect?
Since this is not clear, absurd results could ensue from thinking
that neither the freedom of ethical convictions (in the event that we
considered it a right), nor the freedom of conscience, much less
religious freedom, can be expressed with political ends, when it is
part of the nature of these freedoms to express one’s self on political
or social issues of all kinds (except those that have to do with
partisan propaganda directly). Under this belief, not only can priests
and parishioners of religious associations not express themselves for
political purposes, but neither can any citizen who, protected by the
freedom of conscience or ethical convictions, wants to do so. 52 Is

49. See Javier Saldaña Serrano, Estándares internacionales en materia de libertad religiosa y
resoluciones del Poder Judicial de la Federación (México), in SENTENCIAS DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE
JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN DESDE EL ANÁLISIS DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 415–17 (2011), available at
http://www.hchr.org.mx/files/doctos/Libros/Sentencias_dela_SCJN_desdeel_an%C3%A1lisis_d
elos_DH.pdf.
50. See id. at 417–18.
51. Id. at 418–20.
52. Concerning this, D. Raúl González Schmal said:
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there not a wide margin of discretion for authorities to punish
religious persons or organizations?
Thus, we can conclude that this reform grants an enormous
amount of discretion to authorities to determine when to punish a
religious association or its representatives, upon determining that it
has committed an offense or has carried out manifestations for
political ends. In the author’s opinion, these instruments add to the
long list that the Mexican legislature established to limit the right to
religious freedom.

I.
Another issue that is seen in the reform in question is the
inclusion of a relatively new term in the Mexican constitutional
culture of human rights: the recognition of the “freedom of
conscience.”
Obviously, this freedom is much more familiar to us than that of
ethical convictions; it is often mentioned in international human
rights documents alongside the freedoms of thought and religion. 53
However, there are some critical issues that should be discussed
concerning its inclusion in the Constitution. First, what does the
freedom of conscience mean as a human right? And, above all, what
did the Mexican legislature understand freedom of conscience to
mean when it included it in the Constitution? We have already said

This prohibition seriously violates, prejudicing the public, not only the right of
religious freedom enshrined in the terms of Article 24, which was intended to be
reformed, but also the right to freedom of expression, oral and written information,
and assembly, rights enshrined in Articles 6, 7, and 9 respectively of the Basic Law.
And, even more, following the same purpose of the uncompromising minority of the
lawmakers to exploit the reform to minimize the right of religious freedom, the
discussed paragraph is more restrictive than Article 130 of the Constitution, which
deals with political rights. In effect, a subsection of Article 130 says that ministers of
religion cannot, among other things, “preach in favor of or against any political
candidate, party, or association.” It also adds, “Neither may they oppose the laws of
the country or its institutions, nor insult patriotic symbols in any form, in public
meetings, acts of the sect, or religious literature.”
Now, in the initiated reform of 24, this prohibition is included, not only to ministers
but to all citizens who use “public acts of exercise of this freedom with political
purposes, for proselytizing, or for political propaganda.”
Schmal, supra note 45, at 10.
53. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.”).
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something concerning this when we discussed the issue of
characterizing these rights, 54 but now we develop this point a little
more.
In the doctrinal context of human rights, freedom of conscience
refers to the judgments of reason about the good or bad of human
acts through which the conscience is formed. Thus, for example,
Professor Javier Hervada states the following:
Conscience is the opinion or judgment of practical reason of the
person about the morality of an action that will be made, is being
made, or has been made. It deals with, therefore, a judgment about
the morality of singular and concrete actions that are presented as a
possibility, something being done, or something already done. 55

Thus, that which is protected by the freedom of conscience is
“acting in good conscience; that is, it is a double freedom to act
according to the dictates of conscience and not be forced or
compelled to act against conscience.” 56
Accordingly, it is clear that the formation of such judgments of
practical reason—that is, of one’s conscience—applies to individuals
and to nobody else. Did the Mexican legislature understand this in
this way? Hopefully, yes. It would be problematic to incorporate the
freedom of conscience as a form by which political powers could
influence the formation of the consciousness of the people; the
situation would become sensitive because that power cannot dictate
how we do or do not form our conscience, but can simply prevent
wrongful acts.
This interpretation, that for some could be a windmill 57 or, in
other words, something unreal at this point when reflecting on the
human rights in the world, is not so unreal when we review our
54. See supra Part II.
55. Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 43.
56. HERVADA, LOS ECLESIASTICISTAS, supra note 13, at 222. It must also be said that there
is a whole school of thought that believes that freedom of conscience means an ideological
freedom, that is, the possibility of having a particular worldview. See, e.g., P. Talavera,
Conscientious Health Objection in the Prison Environment, 12 REV ESP SANID PENIT 27, 29 (2010),
available at http://scielo.isciii.es/pdf/sanipe/v12n1/en_05_especial1.pdf (quoting a Spanish
Constitutional Court Sentence that said “given the fact that freedom of conscience is, in turn, a
specification of ideological freedom . . . it can be said that conscientious objection is a right
acknowledged both in an explicit and implicit way by Spanish Constitutional Legislation”).
57. Miguel de Cervantes famously wrote about Don Quixote who attacked windmills that
he believed to be ferocious giants. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIJOTE 60–61 (Edith
Grossman trans., HarperCollins Publishers Inc. 2003) (1605, 1615).
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national history. One need only recall the imposition of an
ideological approach like that of the “secularism” in the education
provided by the State—far removed from any fanaticism and
prejudice and currently set forth in the Constitution itself—to help
us realize that this is not so unreal. This is reminiscent of the
imposition of socialist education that Lazaro Cardenas promoted and
that characterized the education imparted by the State for a long
time. 58
Now, if the meaning of freedom of conscience is identified along
with freedom of religion, and the latter is understood as a kind of
ideological freedom (as is understood by some parts of the
doctrine), 59 this would result in unnecessary repetition because the
ideology of a person and the ability to express this ideology is
already covered by the freedom of thought in Article 6 of the
Constitution, as previously explained.
In line with what has previously been discussed, the obvious
question then is: which of the two meanings is the one that the
Mexican Constitution now protects? If the answer is that the
meaning of freedom of conscience refers to the formation of personal
conscience by political powers, then we would be before a
paternalism that today nobody supports and is absolutely rejected.
Now, if the answer relates to the second meaning, which is that the
freedom of conscience is a kind of ideological freedom, then this is
repetitive. Which is the correct definition?
Finally, it must be noted, as Jorge Adame pointed out, that if the
recognition of freedom of conscience was approved in the given
terms, a right that accompanies that freedom should have been
incorporated, such as the freedom of conscientious objection, which
does not appear anywhere. 60 A right as fundamental as the freedom
of conscience needs to be protected in all its dimensions, the main

58. For a description of Cardenas’ socialist education policies, see Mary Kay Vaughan,

The Educational Project of the Mexican Revolution: The Response of Local Societies, in MOLDING THEIR
HEARTS AND MINDS: EDUCATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 105,
108–09 (John A. Britton ed., 1997).
59. See Javier Saldaña Serrano, Carbonell, Miguel, La libertad religiosa en la Constitución
mexicana (artículos 24 y 130), Documento de Trabajo, in 12 CUESTIONES CONSTITUTIONALES 319
(2005), available at http://ojs.unam.mx/index.php/cuc/article/download/2138/1700; see also
DIONISIO LLAMAZARES FERNÁNDEZ, DERECHO DE LA LIBERTAD DE CONCIENCIA (5th ed. 2004),
available
at
http://www.casadellibro.com/libro-derecho-eclesiastico-del-estado-5ed/9788434430754/984132.
60. Goddard, supra note 14, at 16.
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dimension being that there is the possibility that people may reject a
claim imposed by law when it goes against their deepest values or
most deeply rooted convictions. 61 This right simply does not appear
in the constitutional reform, which confirms that the Mexican
legislature was not interested in broadening the right of freedom of
conscience.
Thus, one can conclude that while recognizing the good of
including freedom of conscience, this was not entirely spelled out
nor sufficiently protected. Issues such as conscientious objection
simply were not introduced, thus implying a half-finished reform.

J.
A final comment must be made, which deals specifically with the
inclusion of the term “secular,” by which the Mexican Republic must
qualify and identify itself, in Article 40 of the Constitution. 62
It must first be established that within the most specialized
doctrine exists a perfectly clear differentiation between the principles
of “separation” of church and state and “secularism” (each with its
own characteristics). 63 Nevertheless, according to the Mexican
mentality—especially
according
to
the
Freemason-Jacobin
mentality—secularism has always been understood, in the best of
cases, as the absolute separation between political powers and the
churches and, in the worst of cases, as the State’s ability to pursue
and attack any form of religious expression in society, mainly that
which comes from the Catholic Church. The first understanding
does not even encompass the term “positive secularism,” 64 and is
purely and simply separation of state. The second is a negative

61. For more on this subject, see DORA MARÍA SIERRA MADERO, LA OBJECIÓN DE
MÉXICO: BASES PARA UN ADECUADO MARCO JURÍDICO (2012), available at
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/7/3083/pl3083.htm.
62. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 40,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
63. See Pedro Juan Viladrich, Los principios informadores del derecho eclesiástico español, in
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 169–260 (2nd ed. 1983); Joaquín Calvo-Álvarez, La
CONCIENCIA EN

presencia de los principios informadores del derecho eclesiástico español en las sentencias del Tribunal
Constitucional, in TRATADO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 243–318 (1994).
64. For an analysis of positive secularism, see Isidoro Martín Sánchez, La laicidad positiva
y su reflejo en los estados miembros de la Unión Europea, in EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO A LAS PUERTAS
DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JUAN GOTI ORDEÑANA 273 (2006), available at
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2379096.

578

DO NOT DELETE

553

1/29/2014 10:02 AM

Unnecessary and Restrictive Constitutional Amendments in Mexico

secularism, typical of dictatorial regimes that violate human rights. 65
Which is the real meaning that was intended in the constitutional
reform by the expression “secular”? The Mexican experience allows
us to believe that the second meaning is the one that the Mexican
legislature seems to have had in mind when it included this term in
the Constitution.
There are plenty of arguments that lead one to believe that this is
true, if we consider the meaning of secularism to be one of
separation. Moreover, persecution was already established in Article
130 of the Constitution, which begins: “The historic principle of
separation of the State and the churches guides the standards
presented in the present article. Churches and other religious
organizations shall be organized under the law.” 66 The next sentence
reads: “It is the exclusive responsibility of the Congress of the Union
to legislate in matters of public denominations, churches, and
religious organizations.” 67
Now, if what was intended was to emphasize the criterion of
secularism of the Republic, it would have been desirable for the
legislators to return to see what they themselves approved at the
time in the Law on Religious Associations and Public Worship, in
which Article 3 expressly states: “The Mexican State is secular. The
same shall exercise authority over all religious activity, individual or
collective.” 68 What purpose then was there in putting this in the
Constitution? None. It was an unnecessary, repetitive, and
superficial inclusion that can only be understood from the
imposition of a nineteenth-century, regressive, and persecutory
ideology, typical of those who do not want to understand what is a
true State of law, respectful of human rights and particularly the
right to religious freedom.
Moreover, it may be useful to draw attention to what the text of
Article 3 of the Law states, since it is the State and not the Republic
who is defined as secular, as is expressly stated in the current Article

65. See ANDRÉS OLLERO TASSARA, LAICIDAD Y LAICISMO 93–124 (2010), available at
http://www.fcjs.urjc.es/departamentos/areas/profesores/p3.asp?id=rzvyxtxwx.
66. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 130,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
67. Id.
68. Ley de Asociaciones Religiosas y Culto Público [Law on Religious Associations and
Public Worship], art. 3, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 15 de Julio de 1992 (Mex.)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/24.pdf.
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40 of the Federal Constitution. 69 This obviously reflects the low
technical level of the Mexican political class who does not know how
to distinguish between a form of a socio-political organization and a
form of government.
III. CONCLUSION
Having identified various conclusions at the end of each
respective argument that was presented, we refer the reader to these
respective sections.
However, the author would like to finish with what D. Raúl
González Schmal stressed, concerning the “enthusiastic”
participation of our legislators in the constitutional reform. The lessthan-lively turnout deserves to be highlighted. In the Chamber of
Deputies, only 260 of the 500 deputies were present, from which
199 voted in favor, 58 voted against, and 3 abstained. 70 This shows
the low standard of the Mexican legislators and the little interest
that such a fundamental right like religious freedom arouses in
them.

69. In this regard Gerardo Cruz González says, “But the adjective ‘secular’ is not a form of
government but a secondary feature like others: multi-ethnic, inclusive, supportive, multireligious, pacifist, non-discriminatory, etc. ‘Secular’ is not a form of government, nor is it a legal
principle, but religious.” González, supra note 26, at 38.
70. Raúl González Schmal, Comentarios sobre la reforma al artículo 24 constitucional, in
REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 9 (2012).
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